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Abstract:
The success of China since 1979 has often been boiled down to market fundamentals,
neglecting its largely state directed system. This essay compares the developmental state
theory of growth, established by historian Chalmers Johnson, to China’s economic practices
over the last 40 years. Ultimately, the purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that China’s
growth is based on a unique application of the developmental state model, and that this model
is potentially transferable to other economies that have yet to develop as robustly.
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China’s phenomenal growth is often regarded as a victory for liberalism inside academic
circles. In fact, much of the growth in East Asian states has been explored by historians as a
victory for the guiding forces of America and their allies until Chalmers Johnson set out an
alternative theory of growth in Japan. The narrative Johnson had published revolved around the
idea that Japan’s growth was due to the unique role that Japanese bureaucracy had played in
the economic development of the country. This model has been described as the
“developmental state” approach, where state guidance plays an active role in shaping economic
outcomes. The theory of the developmental state has been applied to a variety of countries over
the years: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even countries like France. However, China’s
growth is often overlooked by developmental state theorists, who have historically viewed China
as plan ideological rather than plan rational. Although China’s state apparatus is highly
ideological, the approach that China has taken to development may surprise liberal economists
in how strong the presence of the state has been. Rather than simply identifying the reforms
that have been made since 1979 and demonstrating that China has liberalized, this paper seeks
to prove that China’s growth was not caused by the loosening of restrictions alone. After all,
many countries that remain poor are much more liberal than China is, and yet do not experience
the explosive growth that China has. This is where the developmental state thesis becomes
applicable to China, as the state bureaucracy has been involved in quite a few means of
indirectly planning the economy. The developmental state theory will be used to explain how
China’s growth facilitated itself, and point out the conclusion that state-led economic guidance
may be more useful than previous scholars have let on.
In order to accomplish this goal, this paper is divided into three ‘chapters’. The first
chapter is focused on establishing how China has engaged in reform since 1979 and
contextualizes the changes in the economic environment. It serves to highlight what the core
features of the contemporary Chinese economy are and informs the reader why surface-level
historical accounts of China’s growth point to liberalism as the guiding cause. The second
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chapter focuses on defining the idea of the developmental state, starting with the core ideas in
developmental economics as a whole and moving on to the theorists who have developed the
theory of the developmental state over time. The purpose of this chapter is to establish what a
developmental state looks like, as well as who has defined it. It also serves as a reference point
for what other economists have considered development to be over time, demonstrating both
basic textbook relationships as well as research into other forms of developmentalism, such as
Neoclassical, Institutionalist, and Keynesian development. Overall, this chapter helps the reader
understand what economists think about development and specifies the beliefs of
developmental state theorists. The third and final chapter is the most important, as it covers the
ways in which China’s post-reform changes transform China into a developmental state. In this
chapter, there are six aspects explaining China’s status as a developmental state. Chapter three
is of the utmost importance because it synthesizes the ideas of the previous chapters in order to
highlight China’s use of state intervention in order to accumulate national wealth. Ideally, these
chapters will illustrate the basic concept of what a developmental state is and expand upon the
basic concept to include China’s growth model.

Chapter 1: The Reforms of Post-Mao China
This essay has no intention of looking at the Maoist period when making the claim that
China’s explosive growth was a fulfillment of developmental state tenants, and instead focuses
on 1979 onwards, which will be colloquially referenced as the “reform” period under Deng
Xiaoping. The Reform period serves as the frame of reference for two reasons; because many
see this period as the beginning of China’s rapid development, and because this period
transforms China by creating a freer market in a formerly command economy. This section will
briefly describe the trends in economic reform since 1979, as this is necessary in order to
provide a framework of what a Reform economy truly is. China’s economic reformation is
characterized by neoclassicists and heterodox scholars alike as a cautious mix of market
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principles and state-directed growth. Gradual changes to the profit, employment, and price
structure would create situations for greater independent management of local firms, as well as
greater incentives to privately invest in consumption-based industries. Decollectivization had a
hand in generating more efficient agricultural production, and national economic openness
encouraged the exchange of industrial information alongside expanding the scale of the
economy. However, state directed investment and fiscal deficit spending created more
opportunities for private economic bounty, and state-owned industries still played a huge (albeit
diminishing) role in the national economy. This chapter is broken up based on the subject,
beginning with the formation of private and semi-private industry and followed by the reform of
the SOEs, the formation of SEZs and international trade, and final reforms that do not fit into
these three categories. The aim of this chapter is to simply highlight what happened- the
explanation of why the reforms enabled China’s success will be much lengthier. This succinct
introduction to contemporary Chinese economics will provide context for the writing’s overall
claim; China’s growth is based on liberalizing reforms that turned a command economy into a
developmental state, and the role of the state in the way that it interacts with the market is what
has enabled China’s success.
Reform Aspect 1: The Market-Driven Change within the Economy
Before privatization was possible in China, the first step towards a non-command
economy was decollectivization of agriculture. Decollectivization- a separate process from
marketization and privatization- is defined by an agricultural transition away from the processes
of collective labor. While farmers did not have ownership of the factors of production, such as
land and capital, management of business practices became more localized. These reforms
were directed in a top-down fashion to correct the inefficiencies of the agricultural collective
economies, such as poor profit retention structures, lacking investment incentives, and coercive
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state power over local consumption1. In practice, decollectivization took the form of baogan
daohu, which was the division of land from collective farms to household smallholdings for
individual business. Decollectivization not only doled out land, but also distributed the necessary
equipment and inputs for successful production. The state still purchased farm products at a
quota but granted greater authority to peasants in terms of output above or outside of the quota.
In other words, agricultural laborers could now more independently organize their own labor, as
meeting the quota was the only requirement imposed on them and opportunity for profit on the
private market was now possible. As a bonus, produce diversification as a result of the growth
of private demand for non-grain farm goods was encouraged by decollectivization2.
Decollectivization is a step towards the enterprise autonomy that occurred during the 1980’s
and has had broad-reaching positive impacts on the agricultural productivity transformation that
was discussed in the introduction, as gross agricultural output rose to approximately 166% of it’s
pre-decollectivization output just 10 years after the reforms and agricultural labor productivity
rising by 5.2% annually3. It is easy to recognize the importance of agricultural decollectivization
in the positive change in China’s economic conditions.
Alongside the trend of decollectivization, China began instituting marketization-based
reforms to encourage competition. One successful result of marketization was the creation of
the “dual-track” program, intending to encourage production and pricing at optimal, marketbased levels. In 1985, firms were given the right to sell products outside of the planned quota.
Thus, economic activity was divided between the official planned economy, which produced
certain goods for purchase by the state for re-selling, and the market economy, which operated
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outside of the prices determined by the government and instead operated on the economic
intuition of liberalism. Because the government froze the amount of in-plan product it annually
demanded from firms, inter-firm competition became commonplace and production of certain
commodities increased dramatically4. This inter-firm competition is a crucial element of the
shifting economic landscape of reformist China, marking the movement away from monopoly
power over production by the state. The dual track program also implemented another
momentous reform in the form of un-fixed prices. By maintaining a private goods market
alongside the state-led product market, China was able to align prices with the amount
demanded of a good in relation to its relative scarcity5. The dual track system was theoretically
appealing to market and state actors alike, as state actors retain some control of the economy
and non-state actors were able to buy goods at competitive prices. If this is the case, a dual
track system allows a private market to mobilize additional total welfare to the point in which
price and quantity are Pareto optimal without detracting from the quantity of production
undertaken by the state-owned industries. Similarly, overproduction can also be Pareto
improving in a dual-track economy, creating a situation in which states subsidize additional
product generation and allow the market to perform optimally otherwise6. To be sure, the
intuition behind the dual-track system is understandable and useful.
The development of privately-owned business has driven China’s economic growth
considerably. Beginning in 1988 with the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises, the
reformists began allowing corporate entities to form outside of the traditionally state-owned
sector. Millions of collective firms would privatize, leading to a productivity boom in the various
sectors that now had private competitive forces within them. Although state-owned industries
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had to become much more productive in response to the rapid growth of private industry, by
2016 private industry assets were 3.5 times greater than state-owned industry assets in
generating return. State-ownership still dominates certain ‘critical industries’ such as mining and
utilities, but highly profitable light industries in manufacturing are dominated by private
enterprises, which make up four-fifths of all light industry7. The introduction of private industry
incentivized and rewarded productivity, allowed loanable funds to be allocated to private
investment opportunities, and encouraged the cooperation of firms and markets. These features
created an environment conducive to growth in a previously inefficient China. Innovation
facilitated itself from the bottom-up, directed by entrepreneurial actors forming cross-market
interest groups to allow for the promulgation of new advancements more broadly across the
economy. In other words, the initial loosening of regulations allowed for private actors to form
networks of mutually interested agents that promoted their own interests by advocating for
further privatization and market-based exchange and enforced informal operative norms while
legal structures to protect property formed8. The growth of China’s private sector has been a
core factor in the economic growth of China, and it should be recognized as a monumental
reform that the reformers undertook. Although this reform was gradual, and highly contested
even within the reformist group, one can see that these changes in the 1990’s have had a
profound impact on China’s economy today.
Although not private in-and-of-themselves, the curious case of township-village
enterprises (TVEs) gives additional insight into the growth of the market in leading China’s
economic rise. During the decollectivization period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, areas that
had been formerly known as communes now had a new designation: the township. As has been
previously discussed, the decollectivization of the Chinese rural sectors allowed for greater

Lardy, Nicholas. “Private Sector Development.” China’s 40 Years of Reform and Development:
1978–2018, ANU Press, Acton ACT, Australia, 2018. Pp 329–334.
8
Nee, Victor et al. “Market and Institutional Change in China” in The Oxford Companion to the
Economics of China. Oxford University Press, 2014.
7

8
competition between different locales. The main force in the promotion of competition between
townships were the TVEs. TVEs, unlike SOEs, are businesses controlled by the local
government of a village rather than the federal government. TVEs largely fly in the face of
market approaches to economics, as many Classical economists would describe fundamental
property rights as necessary for the successful development of an enterprise. However, several
features played into the overall success of the TVE in encouraging rural growth in the 1980s.
Not only did the TVEs create an environment in which product differentiation and competition
could occur, it also generated a great deal of monetary resources for the local governments that
would be re-invested into public works and wages. Because TVEs have a hard budget
constraint, they also did not fall into the trap of the SOEs of borrowing large amounts of money
with little productive payout. TVEs would stagnate in the 1990s as the market share of private
enterprise began to rise, however the TVEs are a successful version of market socialism9. It is
important to recognize the value of TVEs to more than just agriculture, as industrial TVEs made
up half of China’s industrial output, profit, and value added in 1994. Some see the general
success of TVEs between 1980 and 2000 above private and state-owned firms as a result of
their mixed economic status. On the one hand, there were fewer agency costs associated with
TVEs compared to state firms, as they were freer to retain economic incentives and provide
them to the community. On the other hand, there were fewer transaction costs associated with
being a TVE compared to private firms, as TVEs had greater access to loanable funds and
experienced fewer restrictions to trade on the market. The fact that TVEs were tied to local
government gave it a corporatist nature as well, providing the TVEs with governors that act like
a board of directors. The fact that TVEs aligned public and private interests optimized their
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operative efficiency10. The TVE serves as an important predecessor to the private firm in
managing China’s rise, utilizing local corporatism to generate rapid returns and economic
profits.

Reform Aspect 2: State-Owned Enterprise Reforms
Reforms that generated a semi-private sector were matched by reforms that loosened
the role of the state in the economy without dismantling it completely. The structure of local
state-owned enterprises changed in multiple ways: profit retention now existed, managerial
responsibilities were localized, labor relations were decentralized, and dual-track production
was implemented. Each of these subjects deserves sufficient time spent on their descriptions.
Beginning with profit retention reforms, A clear policy shift over time transpired as marketization
reforms induced great success. Starting in 1980, Zhao Ziyang and other central planners
determined that individual firms would be allowed to keep a portion of their profits that would be
dedicated to worker welfare, bonuses, and productive gains in the form of new investment,
determined by taking the ratio of the previous year’s finances dedicated to the aforementioned
activities to the overall revenue of the firm. In other words, enterprises retained a share of their
current real profits while the remainder was allocated to the government. By 1986, however, a
new form of profit retention in state-owned industries became commonplace; chengbao, or longterm contracting, a system in which individuals would negotiate multi-year agreements of a
percentage of profits that said individual would fully command. This scheme was both a further
market-based distribution of profits, as these long-term contracts tended to offer greater
percentages of profit control, and the establishment of a pseudo-equity market for state-owned
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industries11. By transforming the managerial system so contract-holders became entangled and
responsible for the success of the firms, as contract-holders had to purchase their contracts in
the first place, the reformers hoped that firm managers would take a greater interest in profit
maximizing behavior12. The creation of profit incentives is a considerable economic reform when
recounting the Reform period because there had previously only been ideological incentives to
production.
The introduction of benefits from profit retention was matched by an increase in local
control over managerial practices. Although the Reformist state would be hesitant to give too
much power to local enterprises in the early 1980’s, managers began to gain control over labor
and practical decision making. Managers became the primary directors of their enterprises in
1984, replacing the party directors that initially controlled these firms. As a result, individual
state-owned firms became responsible for generating their own production plans. Labor
relations changed dramatically as a result of these reforms. Individualized wage allocations
were drawn up as a fraction of total profitability, and wage increases (including bonuses) were
determined by overall productivity rather than profits retained. Workers also began to shift away
from lifetime employment guarantees toward individual contract assessments, leading to
negotiable wage increases over time and the opportunity to reevaluate one’s employment every
five years13. Like increased profit retention, changes in the autonomy of managers over decision
making for local enterprises was meant to entrust greater responsibility for economic output to
local firms, as many had been held afloat by subsidization up until this point and were not as
profitable as they could have been. By liberalizing the managerial structure of individual firms,
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managers would be incentivized to increase profits due to their newly held stake in the firm’s
success. Workers would be incentivized similarly by the possibility of wage increases
proportional to the profitability of the firm14. Over the immediate years to come, these reforms
would unfortunately lead to massive losses for the SOE’s despite increases in total factor
productivity. The rate of wage growth outpaced the rate of productive growth significantly, and
this would be detrimental to the success of these enterprises. However, these reforms would
lead to the privatization of more than 300,000 SOE’s at the turn of the century and demonstrate
the marketization of these industries in the long-run15. Still, the role of the SOEs during the
Reform period should be appreciated for reasons that will be addressed in Chapter 3.

Reform Aspect 3: Openness to International Trade
As China’s internal industries became more market-oriented, the nation also became
open to international trade through the Open Door Policy. Originally proposed in 1978, the Open
Door Policy was a series of reforms dedicated to increasing the interaction between foreign
economies and the domestic economy of China in order to promote long-term productivity
growth. The reformers realized that isolationist rhetoric was limiting China’s comparative
advantage in labor availability and natural resources, but creating an economy that would be
integrated into the world economic system could lead to an expansion of Chinese enterprise
worldwide. In order to encourage overseas investment, the exchange rate was inflated
considerably, technological imports were encouraged through low tariffs, and Special Economic
Zones in which private enterprise could flourish were established to promote foreign direct
investment. The reform was not limited to economics, as China also began to join international
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organizations and engage in cross-cultural exchange16. These reforms mark a clear shift away
from the previous trade policies of the Chinese state. Before these reforms, trade was regulated
through national corporations that controlled any imports or exports that would arrive in China.
These corporations would purchase any imports or exports and change the price to fit the state
price apparatus. By dismantling these state corporations, China was able to marketize the trade
process and encourage FDI growth17. As a result of these reforms, foreign capital investment
increased from 2 billion dollars to 18.8 billion dollars between 1983 and 1992, and by 1992
China had exported goods equivalent to 20% of its gross national product18. In other words, the
purpose of the Open Door Policy was to advance the Chinese economy by loosening the
protectionist measures that it had subjected itself to during the Maoist era and engaging in
greater international trade. By doing so, the Chinese economy opened itself up to greater
opportunities for advancement through joint projects with foreign investors.
Among the reforms of the Open Door Policy, the creation of Special Economic Zones
has been of particular import. Beginning in 1979 with four cities, China introduced the concept of
SEZs to introduce foreign capital and technology into the Chinese mainland. Firms operating in
said SEZs had very little oversight and minimal tax burdens compared with the rest of China.
The hope of the reformers was to try and force the industries in these areas to become
internationally competitive and advance, leaving the gains from trade to allow the information
and investment to diffuse into non-SEZ areas as well19. These first four zones were largely
successful in attracting foreign investment. These areas’ abundance of available space for
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development, focus on industry befitting the comparative advantage of the region, and wellimplemented foundational rules and regulations made China’s SEZs particularly enticing to
foreign investment, and as a result Shenzhen would become one of China’s most businessoriented cities. As a result of these early successes, China began developing offshoot SEZs
known as Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) and Border SEZs in 1984
and 2000 respectively20. Shenzhen, more than any of the other initial SEZs, became the model
used in developing the offshoot SEZs to come. By relaxing labor laws and wage controls,
Shenzhen was able to attract incredible levels of immigration. At the same time, Shenzhen
integrated foreign technology by operating numerous joint enterprises with foreign firms. The
diffusion of foreign technology throughout Shenzhen allowed for the establishment of numerous
competitive domestic firms, leading to a surge in indigenous patents21. SEZs changed the way
China interacted with the world and delivered impressive improvements to China’s foreign trade.
Finally, the Belt and Road initiative has been indicative of China’s future in terms of
growing economic openness and globalization. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the
beginning of this initiative meant to develop the infrastructure of underdeveloped areas within
China and abroad and strengthen the economic linkages between areas in the plan. Because
the OBOR (One Belt One Road) initiative seeks to develop foreign infrastructure as well as
domestic, it is largely seen as a means of creating greater economic ties between China and
participants in this program. The addition of the OBOR initiative to China’s many lasting reforms
has promoted the image of China as amenable to free international trade while also allowing it
to engage in massive infrastructure development projects to assist both Chinese and foreign
interests. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a key example of the benefits of this
phenomenon, where both parties benefit economically from a joint development partnership.
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The promotion of Chinese manufacturing firms through the extension of these industries abroad
allows this plan to promote profit-seeking behavior. The relocation of these firms to lower-cost,
higher demand areas is a promising goal of the plan22. By 2017, the OBOR initiative had
generated a multitude of joint agreements for the development of economic infrastructure
abroad. Cooperation between these largely underdeveloped nations also allows for a
permeation of Chinese industries into the resource-rich locales of said nations, such as the
increasing prominence of Chinese industries in Laotian mining following the development of the
Pan-Asian Railway. A similar situation is present in Indonesia, where China contributes to the
second largest amount of foreign investment (following Singapore)23. Many also see the OBOR
initiative as indicative of a new phase of Chinese growth, where China consolidates its
economic gains and reaches new levels of international prominence once embroiled in the world
economy. By increasing the scale of the economy, in other words, China has given its
manufacturing sector an avenue for sustained future growth24. The Belt and Road Initiative
seems to be the future of the Chinese growth economy, which is why it is of importance.

Reform Aspect 4: Development of Infrastructure
Much of this chapter has focused on the changes to the market structure of China as it
became more liberal, but this should not discount the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on
Chinese development. The government engaged in much of the necessary investment behavior
to kickstart manufacturing growth in the 1980’s and has remained in control of heavy industry
development to this day. The development of a more sprawling economic infrastructure began
in the 1990’s and has been important to China’s ability to compete with international firms. The
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“Go West” and “Reviving of the Northeast” policies of the late 90’s have been examples of
China’s infrastructure investment boom and have caused productivity to grow more evenly
across China as a whole. As a result of China’s infrastructure spending, China’s transportation,
shipping, power, and telecommunications sectors are all some of the most extensive in the
world25. The improvement of the quality of the infrastructure since 1978 has been noteworthy as
well, with the energy consumption of China’s power generation growing at half the rate of the
growth in output between 1978 and 2005 and electricity usage growing at a rate of 11%
annually. Similarly, investment in telecommunications development dominated national interests
in the 90’s to the extent in which it reached 1.5% of GDP in 1995. China’s infrastructure boom
dominated the 90’s and has been rising since then, leading to much greater amounts of fiscal
expenditure on said investment26. Chinese investment is largely a product of fiscal expenditure,
borrowing, and market-based financing, However, the extent of the private market in this
investment has been extremely slim, and most of the infrastructure investment in China has
been directed by national or sub-national groups. Through the years, 5-year plans have broadly
expanded the functional infrastructure available to ever-growing manufacturing and urban firms
to increase the productivity of the Chinese economy27. Infrastructural development has been a
state-led factor in China’s output growth that is often ignored in studies of the subject, and yet it
has been a core feature in China’s development since the 1990’s.
While the nation became more open to marketization and globalization, reform of the
financial sector took place as well. Although the Peoples’ Bank of China still dominates the
domestic market for finance, the 1980’s brought about reforms to make the financial sector
more competitive by introducing cooperative banks. These banks allowed for the financing of
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private and community enterprise at a local level, mobilizing funds to the previously untapped
markets of commercial industry and agriculture. The reforms transformed the layout of the
financial sector from a passive, singular institution that accounted for the projects and plans of
the economic planners to a deep multiplicity of interlocking credit groups and a market for
capital in stock exchanges. State-owned commercial banks make up most of the deposits of the
Chinese economy, and still have an immense amount of power over the direction of investment
within the country. However, they now operate much more along the lines of commercial banks
and finance investment projects outside of the public sector and have become business
oriented in the modern day. The Joint-Stock Commercial Banks and the City banks, however,
have to perform with a much more profit- oriented framework since they are not a part of the
Central Bank and thus have driven a large quantity of China’s new commercial investment. The
main force causing China’s reform of the financial sector was the large quantity of nonproliferating loans that were given out to the failing SOEs that had a soft borrowing constraint.
Realizing that the financial system was doomed to collapse, reformers in the 1990’s became
dedicated to building a much greater stock of savings in the economy and cutting out the toxic
lending behavior of the past. At the same time, banks became more focused on securing
profitable loans with positive futures regardless of the type of ownership of the firm taking the
loan. At the same time, the allowance of the circulation of shares in Chinese businesses allowed
for the creation of a stock market, leading to the number of circulating shares to go from 0% of
GDP to 15% in just 9 years28. The reforms of the financial sector have been a considerable shift
in the attitude of the Chinese state and have led to much more responsible domestic finance
practices.
The reforms broadly characterize the Chinese post-Mao experience. Although there is
clearly more to be said about this subject, these shifts are the core changes that are necessary
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to understand what a Reform economy looks like. Despite these specifics not coming up much
in the following chapter, it is important to continue to bear these reforms in mind for the third.
Consider why these changes in particular lead to Chinese economic success while an outline of
developmental economics and developmental state theory is being provided. Why do these
changes matter, and do they provide insight into our definition of the developmental state? As
the argument of this paper becomes more complex, this base level of knowledge will become
increasingly important to understanding why China can be considered a developmental state
with idiosyncrasies.

Chapter 2: Theories of Economic Development and the Developmental State Theory
This essay began with a discussion of the reforms within China between 1979 and the
present, but in order to understand why these reforms wrought success, the core theories of
development economics must be laid out. Thus, this chapter highlights three crucial pieces of
information that are necessary to understanding all economic development. The first two
sections of the chapter dives into the core theories of development, explaining the perspectives
on how growth transpires microeconomically and what factors are necessary to accelerating
development. There is plenty of controversy between these thinkers, however the theory this
essay advances, the theory of the developmental state, is covered in the third part of the
chapter. This final section deals with the theory of the developmental state, which traditionally
has focused on East Asia but has broadened its horizons considerably in recent years. The
focus on the developmental state will come into play in the later chapters, where having
knowledge of the main theories of Amsden, Johnston, Chang, and Evans is a necessity.
Overall, this chapter seeks to answer the question of why development occurs at differing
speeds at all, and what factors play into an economy’s development.
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Part 1: The Basic Quantitative Theories of Development
The primary models of quantitative economic growth employed by contemporary
scholars are the Harrod-Domar model and the Solow model. These two models are highly
contested regarding which one is more accurate to the expansion of an economy over time,
however they both operate within similar bounds and variables. The Harrod-Domar model of
economic growth alleges that savings in the economy (the fraction of income not utilized in
present consumption) dictates the level of capital investment that will transpire through the
loanable funds market. This capital accumulation, which transpires through the repurposing of
the extra funds of households to the demand for finance of firms, is the primary agent that
inspires economic growth. Growth, then, is a linear process, which facilitates itself through a
higher rate of national savings than the rate of annual capital depreciation in a country. Put
more specifically, the Harrod-Domar equation is the rate of savings divided by the ratio of capital
to output made equal to the rate of growth in the economy plus capital depreciation29. This is a
crucial economic relationship to understand because it establishes how growth occurs, and
what the suggested relationship between savings and investment is. According to HarrodDomar theories of growth, capital accumulation is the way forward in promoting robust positive
change in the economy. This view of growth is extremely basic. However, the Harrod-Domar
model is also important to the rest of the piece, in that it suggests high levels of saving are
positive for economic growth.
The Solow growth model, on the other hand, diverges from the Harrod-Domar model in
its understanding of the determinants of economic growth. Although the Solow model also
considers savings as the base in which funding for capital investment is repurposed, it does not
see capital accumulation through high rates of saving as the determinant of economic growth.
The Solow growth model projects that the relationship between capital accumulation and output
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exhibits diminishing marginal returns because all other factors are fixed. In other words, the
productivity of an additional unit of capital is diminishing as more units are added to a short run
economic model. The Solow growth model predicts that the growth of an economy will be
moving toward a “steady state” in which the returns on capital in GDP per capita will be equal to
the cost of an additional unit of capital, and at that point it will no longer be productive to
continue expanding outward, leading to a cessation of growth. The Solow growth theory expects
the growth of an economy to be diminishing over time when all else is held equal, as the capital
accumulation is approaching the steady state. This contrasts with the Harrod-Domar model, as
the solution to growth promotion is no longer a high rate of saving but rather technical progress.
In the Solow growth model, the only way to achieve sustained economic growth is to raise the
productive efficiency of the capital within the economy through research and development30.
This will cause the steady state of GDP to continue to expand outwards and allow for capital
accumulation to continue to move toward the steady state without worries of it reaching the
steady state. Speaking metaphorically, imagine running a race in which the goal is continuing to
move farther away. Technological progress turns the attainment of the steady state of GDP per
capita into a Sisyphean task and is the core driving force in economic progress in the Solow
growth model.

Part 2: The Primary Analytical Frameworks of Development
However, these models do not capture the sociopolitical actions that generate the best
path to productive growth. What system of economic thought should we undertake in order to
promote the most positive outcomes? Scholarly debate on the subject has been intensive and
inconclusive, however this essay carries the torch of the developmental state model. Before we
introduce this theory, it is necessary to understand the other fundamental approaches to
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development as a practice. Neoliberalism is the dominant school of thought, and it has a
developmental champion in the form of Deepak Lal. Lal argues that the rise of global capitalism
has been the most magnificent source of development for the international economy, leading to
astronomical growth in worldwide measures of GDP. This was particularly true for 19th century
England, which is the model he uses to formulate his argument that the turn towards antiglobalization and anti-liberalization prevents the economic growth of developing economies. By
globalizing the economy, Lal argues the Ricardian model of comparative advantage will carry
the economy of a country to its most efficient level of output. Not only that, but competition is
said to foster dynamic growth between sectors and generate long-term technological progress.
However, according to Lal, domestic distortions of pareto optimality will transpire if protectionist
policies are enacted and thus the economy will not operate at its most efficient output. Of
course, this causes Lal to lend himself to significant anti-collectivism. For Lal, economies
unbound by international regulation will be operating in a much more efficient framework given
that international organizations maintain property rights. By engaging in protectionist or dirigiste
economic policy, many states are not acting in accordance with the tenants of development.
The role of the state is to be a guardian, not to be an actor. Lal also claims that advocates of
dirigiste regimes are misrepresenting the causes of poverty and inequality, and that global
capitalism has been alleviating the poverty that developing countries experience. He believes
that capitalism is not a greed-based system, according to the trends in global development
since the 80’s31. Ultimately, Lal argues that free trade is the core feature in promoting a healthy
global economy, but he mischaracterizes the dirigiste as people who do not believe in free trade
or globalization. As we will come to see, there can be an intersection between government
intervention and global trade.
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One of the core frameworks of economic development necessary in understanding the
argument that this paper makes is Douglass C North’s new institutional economics (NIE). To
North, institutions play a core role in shaping the economy by reducing economic uncertainty
and rising to new features of an environment that may cause disequilibrium. Changes to the
economic framework of a society require updating from institutions to adapt to new incentive
structures and production functions according to North. Social science is not
phenomenologically ergodic, and thus there will be no single “correct” or “optimal” economy but
rather a series of dynamic changes to economic success as the institutions of a society change.
These institutions are formed through historical analysis of similar situations, though this does
not work if the situation is truly novel. Because situations are uncertain and non-ergodic,
economic understandings of rationality must be supported by understandings of sociological,
cognitive, and environmental features that color the formation of institutions. Organized activity
within the economy generates the institutions that are necessary for the movement away from
uncertainty, and these institutions take the form of formal rules. The structure and success of
economic markets are a reflection of those who create institutions, which is why institutions are
necessary for economic change over time. Because this is the case, economies often
experience a form of “path dependency”; they have difficulty shifting away from a particular
progression of institutions once they become formalized. Often, political institutions take on the
role of governing economic processes that are too costly for any individual private actor to profit
off. North notes that economic efficiency is often a result of the norms of a society, and that
those norms cannot be easily changed. However, institutional change can facilitate itself over
time, whether in a path dependent way or a novel way. The organization of institutions that will
transpire are largely based on the trends in these changes, and thus one must understand
these changes in order to understand economics32. North writes that our understanding of the
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economy is based on the institutions that guide it, and these institutions are what fundamentally
determine the pace of economic change.
Finally, the Keynesian perspective on development goes a step further than the
institutionalist approach by advocating for a relatively considerable role of the state in
encouraging macroeconomic stability and growth through government investment programs.
Unlike the institutionalist approach, Keynesian thought requires an active government presence
in the markets to prevent them from failing. As we will come to see, this is a crucial part of the
developmental state theory that this essay is based on. Keynes himself addresses the role of
the government in determining optimal outcomes in Chapters 18 and 21 of his General Theory,
establishing a few fundamental points that this essay will demonstrate real examples of in the
developmental states. First, Keynes believed that employment was based on the relative
willingness of the employer to hire more workers given a degree of effective demand for their
product. In other words, output to Keynes would only change given a higher demand for the
output in question, and this would drive both investment and employment to a higher level.
Second, Keynes believed that the role of the government was to prevent the fluctuation of the
economy from harming the general level of employment and output during a depression by
engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy, spending more during times of crisis in order to keep
the output of the economy high33. These points are crucial because they are the first real case
for interventionism that we get to see that is not explicitly Marxist, and thus the Keynesian line of
reasoning has a bit of salience to economic historians that advocate for a developmental state
approach. Keynes advocated for the government to engage in appropriate spending in order to
keep the general level of investment, employment, and output high, and this kind of reasoning
was fundamentally a part of the success of the developmental states.
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Part 3: An Examination of the Developmental State Theory of National Growth
The foundational work establishing the theory of the developmental state in its most
rudimentary form comes from a historical text on Japanese bureaucracy, The MITI and The
Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 by Chalmers Johnson. Johnson’s
seminal thesis is that Japan has used a particular economic strategy where the state and the
zaibatsu/keiretsu have intertwined in what Johnson calls a ‘plan rational’ economy. For
Johnson, the Japanese government has used formative industrial policy and state-led
investment to engage in economic planning that was formerly not considered by free market nor
socialist economists. Johnson makes this explicit when he says
The issue [of what makes a developmental state] is not one of
state intervention in the economy. All states intervene in their
economies for various reasons… The question is how the
government intervenes and for what purposes. The particular
Japanese definition of this role and the relationship between that
role and the economic miracle are at once the major components
and primary causes of the resurgent interests of political economy
in the late twentieth century34.
By extending the role of the government outside of the regulation of standards and practices
and into the guidance of investment and capital formation, Japan was able to promote highspeed development. This began with the fukoku-kyohei movement of the Meiji period, remained
salient in the quasi-fascist Taisho military government, and institutionalized itself after World
War 2 in the form of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The Japanese
government’s overarching fixation on rapid development generated a unique system of
economic oversight that led the GNP growth Japan experienced. Johnson also argues that this
was a non-ideological version of planning, differentiating itself from socialist planned economies
by engaging an apolitical bureaucracy35. By utilizing rationalization and structural adjustment
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policies, the Japanese government has led Japan from a nation that was not even considered
for colonization to one of the most powerful economies on the planet.
Johnson goes into further detail about the economic bureaucracy of Japan and its
evolution over time. Unlike the Tokugawa era’s samurai, the civil officials of the Meiji era and
afterward were meant to be highly educated and held broad control over the administration of
the law. Although the SCAP did not engage in much post-war meddling with the Japanese
bureaucracy, an internal drive for further administrative efficiency characterized the late 1940’s.
The characteristic of Japanese economic bureaucracy that makes it somewhat unique is its
ability to generate laws itself, rather than rely on the Diet to generate laws for it to enforce. In
other words, a prime responsibility of the MITI is controlling the process of industrialization,
giving it a fundamental power to promote certain industries in their growth. The revolving door
politics of the economic bureaucracies and the positions in the Liberal-Democratic Party has
further solidified their liberal spending and budget authorities. Japan’s history of public-private
partnerships extends as far back as the 19th century, beginning in organizations such as the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, both of
which engaged in extensive joint operations with the Yawata and Mitsubishi zaibatsu.
Controlling funds for industrial expansion through the Bank of Japan allowed finance ministers
of the 1920’s and 30’s drive investment in home-grown capital projects both domestically and in
Japan’s colonies. More than anything else, the bureaucracies shaped the creation of globally
competitive firms through industrial rationalization policies that targeted TFP growth. This
rationalization targeted the larger owners of capital within Japanese society at that point,
creating an environment in which ‘big business’ and the government colluded to promote
technological growth in fishing, mining, and other key sectors36. Thus, Japan’s pre-war period
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began the trend of the “developmental state”, and the post war period would come to hone this
experimental policy instrument.
Although the attitudes of the Japanese state between the end of the Shogunate and the
fall of the military government in 1949 certainly shaped the institutions of “plan rationality”, it was
the post-war period in which high speed growth really took off within the developmental state
model. The primary agents of this change were the recently formed MITI, which utilized
expansionary monetary policy through the state-owned Bank of Japan and Japanese
Development Bank to revitalize the commercial atmosphere. Borrowing funds from the bank
was cheap and easily managed compared to issuing bonds, and the MITI rebuilt the zaibatsu
trading companies while also maintaining oversight over said trading companies. The capital
expansion from the government banks induced a greater deal of inter-firm competition between
big businesses, generating productivity growth alongside investment growth. The savings
necessary for capital accumulation were provided through competitive domestic interest rates
and foreign inflows of capital. The government-led growth also gave the state a role in which
industries would be financially supported in their endeavors, allowing for the development of
firms that would cater to the international market in the long run rather than an express focus on
comparative advantage in primary product industries. Alternative industrial policy was also used
to promote sectoral growth, such as tax incentives on export or high-efficiency products, low
interest on certain industries loans, and technological import funding. At the same time, the MITI
guided the marketing and business practices of the firms that it promoted to maximize the
potential of said firms, while engaging in selective trade protectionism for developing industries.
What we learn from Johnson’s writing is, contrary to neoliberal conceptions of growth, the state
can play a prominent role in the success of a nation’s economic development outside of the
establishment of property rights and regulations. Johnson uses the MITI to prove that the
Japanese economy has been so successful because of the state’s intervention in the economy,
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and his writing is the first step in theorizing the structure we recognize as the “developmental
state”.
Johnson’s work marks the beginning of a new sect of institutionalist developmental
thought but constrains his analysis to Japan alone. Alice Amsden, however, expands upon the
concept of a rapidly growing, state-led economy in her piece, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea
and Late Industrialization. Amsden proposes that there has been a similar experience between
the development experiences of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, and indicates that
the growth-promoting state has been fundamental in these regional successes. However,
Amsden does not follow Johnson’s trend of focusing solely on the bureaucracy as initiating the
high-speed growth. Rather, Amsden describes the basis of Korean growth as industrial policy,
factor productivity growth in the global economy, and the generation of large, hyper-systemized
firms. Amsden contends that the government has played a crucial role in the development of
Korea’s economy, however, noting that the direction of investment by state actors was crucial in
sparking entrepreneurial activity in heavy industry, and said investment was a core cause for the
capital accumulation Korea achieved. By maintaining large foreign debts, gaining income from
foreign aid programs, and utilizing the high level of internal savings, the Korean government
was able to direct large amounts of funds to an assortment of planned activities. Five-year
development plans for individual sectors were crucial to the formation of profitable firms in highvalue sectors, such as electronics. Amsden builds on the developmental narrative by claiming
that, by deliberately engaging in substantial governmental subsidization activities outside of the
free market, late industrializing countries were able to cause their economies to develop more
quickly than countries that have stuck to the prescribed Bretton Woods format of neoliberal, low
wage growth37. Amsden does not, however, let government spending alone explain away the
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growth of the economy. She goes on to highlight the importance of changes to the firm structure
of Korea that financed its growth.
Amsden argues that one of the core features of the high-speed growth of late developed
nations was largely based on a drive for productivity growth alongside the state-sponsorship of
the chaebol. The transformation of productivity occurred in Korea largely because of the
development and expansion of capital as well as the increase in comparative advantage over
time. In terms of both human and technological capital, the development of the administrative
and engineering capacities of the Korean workforce allowed for rapid industrialization, and
allowed for the development of a structured, specialized command chain within firms. Thus,
capital went through two primary transformations: “widening” and “deepening”. This means that
industrial firms began to rapidly grow in terms of the capital available to it, and the scale of
Korean firms began to rise (widening). It also means that capital per worker increased as the
scale of the economy widened, leading to a greater level of capital-intensive production
(deepening). At the same time, labor productivity increased dramatically through increases in
high-value labor and managerial work. Chaebols innovated quickly by raising the level of
investment in research and development, alongside massive imports of foreign technology and
knowledge systems in order to raise the technological standard. Subcontracting expanded the
specificity of individual Korean firms and allowed the big businesses to form linkages with
smaller firms, which encouraged further productivity. A substantial contributor to the boom in
productivity was the high level of societal investment in education, leading to the
aforementioned increase in the quality of managerial groups and engineers. For Amsden, this
education is of great importance to the capital development that Korea has experienced38.
Amsden breaks away from Johnson’s attribution of late industrial growth to industrial policy
solely, as she suggests that the intensive focus on total factor productivity growth through
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capital development within the economy takes form within the chaebols of the era. For Amsden,
this non-policy capital development is of import as well.
Amsden continues to add to the theory of the developmental state by explaining that late
development facilitated itself in Korea through the national orientation towards strategic
comparative advantage formation. In other words, Korea developed industries that were not
necessarily of prominence in Korea before the 1960’s and 70’s with the intention of fostering
growth in highly profitable sectors. In doing so, Korea transitioned away from traditional
productive undertakings that had been the primary source of national income in the past,
indicated by the fade into obscurity of the textile industry. Although these textile industries had
been major revenue and job sources during the era of Japanese occupation and long after, the
national drive toward industrial and electronics-based chaebol led to the obsolescence of the
textile industry over time. Amsden argues that this is because the textile firms, unlike heavy and
consumer industry, operated on short-term, static conceptions of profit-maximizing, leading to
the stagnation of the industry as investment moved away from new capital formation and
training in textiles and towards greater investment in steel, automobiles, and other mechanical
products. The lack of traditional industry diversification and growth led to their ultimate downfall.
On the flipside, the production of heavy industry flourished due to the large amount of money
spent on making chaebol internationally competitive. The export-oriented big businesses had to
perform at an optimal level to remain in the market with already developed firms worldwide, so it
was necessary for said businesses to learn from their competitors while being subsidized for
their short-term losses by government spending. Thus, innovation was a major goal of Korean
businesses and said innovation (whether it be from endogenous or exogenous sources) was
sponsored by the government in any way possible. As a result, Korean shipbuilding, steel
production, cement production, and more all became internationally competitive at a rapid
speed, and the prior focus on less growth-oriented textile manufacture faded into the
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background39. Amsden is crucial in pointing out that development of Korean industrial business
was not accidental but instead was a carefully planned endeavor to raise the competitiveness of
key firms.
Although Amsden and Johnson are both necessary scholars in building an
understanding of the developmental state, they do so through a myopic lens, accounting only
for the individual nations that they focus on. Peter Evans, in his book Embedded Autonomy:
States and Industrial Transformation goes a step further in generating a cohesive model of what
state intervention in the growth of the economy can do using multiple states as points of
reference. Evans focuses on Brazil, India, and South Korea in generating his theory of the state
as an active participant in the growth of an economy. Like the other scholars, Evans questions
the neoclassical approach in which the state’s only role in the economy is to provide regulatory
insight and property institutions. Evans believes that the development of capital and welfare are
both tied to the state’s role in the economy, but it must be particular and deliberate in the way it
intervenes in the market. In order to achieve economic growth, Evans theorizes that it is
necessary for the state to foster profitable comparative advantages within the world market
rather than passively abiding by one’s existing niche. Thus, variations in the speed of
development have to do with the role of the state in a society. The term “embedded autonomy”
stems from the correct type of state in fostering development, which has a coherent structure of
bureaucratic corporatism while maintaining a degree of responsibility to the people of the nation.
There are four roles in which a state with embedded autonomy can play in the economy,
custodian, demiurge, midwife, or husband. A custodian takes on the role of a regulator, while
the demiurge takes on the role of an active producer. Similarly, the midwife encourages private
entrepreneurship through actions such as infant industry protection, allowing for the growth of
these firms without direct state involvement. The state that engages in husbandry is one that
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actively assists in the process of entrepreneurial investment, performing subsidization and even
state-led enterprise. All four of these tools are meant to be practiced and applied in specific
situations rather than any one dominating the discourse, but the nature of the state plays a role
in determining which type (or types) of economic actor the state will be40. Evans uses this
framework to explain which strategies have been useful in fostering state-directed investment in
India, Brazil, and Korea, and forms some interesting conclusions about how the state can
positively impact the development of a country.
These four roles are discretionary, not one-size-fits-all, but Evans notes that certain
sectoral performances depend on the role that the state plays in its development. By optimizing
the role of the state in a sector, the comparative advantage of a state can be maximized in turn,
which is a notion that builds on what Amsden had written prior. For instance, Evans suggests
that mining is often organized by a demiurge state at the local level while controlled by
multinational corporations at a global level. He writes that states can be formative in demiurge
roles in general, but have difficulty penetrating established international markets of resource
ownership. The demiurge role and the husbandry role are capable in transforming the industrial
and consumption sectors of a given economy, respectively. However, in order to be effective in
these roles the state must be well-embedded into the economic framework of the country and
have an efficient bureaucracy in managing these transformations, which India struggled with. In
general, a demiurge role is more effective when barriers to entry are large and technology
necessary for production is not yet monopolized on a global scale. If either of these things are
untrue, husbandry or midwifery are needed in order to encourage transnational corporations to
do business with budding national firms. The use of the regulatory arm has also been effective
in promoting national economic growth through more indirect interventions, such as protection
policies, human and technological capital development in the form of education, and enterprise
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promotion. These were features that Johnson had particularly heralded, but are applicable
within the regulatory apparatus of many more state groups. This state promotion and policing
are largely responsible for the development of information technology in Brazil, India, and
Korea. The Bhabha Atomic Research Center group, the barbudhinos of the military regime, and
the Blue House technocrats are all iconic representations of state groups creating private sector
jobs in IT through state intervention and regulation. The importance of husbandry as a means of
fostering technological innovation and comparative advantage in a competitive, private
environment are well represented with Korea’s swift IT growth41.
The aforementioned scholars have all grown the theory of the developmental state by
taking different considerations and approaches in suggesting an alternative path to development
that certain countries have practiced, however the formalization of the theory is largely thanks to
the works of Ha-Joon Chang. In Meredith Woo-Cumming’s The Developmental State, Chang
expresses that the developmental state may be more suited to promoting economic growth than
the neoliberal model of growth in his chapter “The Economic Theory of the Developmental
State”. For Chang, neoliberals mischaracterize state-led economies becoming corrupt
organizations that do not operate within the rationality of the market, as neoliberals frame this
possibility as an absolute certainty. However, Chang argues that the nature of the
developmental state can foster dynamic efficiency (that is, efficiency when all factors are held
variable) better than the liberal market mechanism can, and that liberals do not account for
“market failures” where the interests of a multitude of private actors do not necessarily lead to
the most socially optimal outcomes. Unlike the liberal market, which only engages in statically
efficient outcomes, the state can take a role in promoting the long-term growth of the economy,
raising productivity and investment capital in a much more prescriptive way than the so-called
invisible hand. The use of the state as a means of coordination of investment efforts, as
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Johnson and Amsden write about in their theses, can be the most effective way of encouraging
the growth of the economy. Chang also points out that states are critical institutions in most
every economy, including liberal market economies such as the United States and the UK, and
the importance of these institutions to determining investment, employment, and economic
stability betrays the neoliberal argument that state intervention in the economy will be inherently
a maladjustment42. Ultimately, Ha-Joon Chang establishes a basic understanding for the reader
that the liberal theory of development is flawed, and in his later works he provides a
fundamental framework for the developmental state as a concrete theory.
Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder: Economic Development in Historical Perspectives
has been a formative piece of work in applying the theory of the developmental state more
broadly to most developed countries in some way or another. Chang proposes that the laissezfaire economists have approached the development of highly developed nations during the
industrial revolution incorrectly. The history of most of these countries, Chang alleges, is fraught
with examples of industrial, trade, and technology policies that were extremely important to the
success of infant enterprise. It was only after the national industry blossomed that the wealthy
countries became free-trade oriented, but this orientation has prevented other countries from
applying the same techniques and becoming successful as well. Thus, Chang views the
international economy to be characterized by rich nations “kicking away the ladder” of
development after they have utilized it to amass great power, wealth, and standing. What is
particularly interesting about Chang’s analysis is that he goes outside of the countries that are
traditionally associated with interventionist state operations, namely Germany, Switzerland, and
France, and represents the so-called bastions of free trade, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, as beneficiaries of a developmental state approach. He does so by referencing
protectionist policies such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the US and the Corn Laws of the UK,
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both of which were used to protect infant industries from unwanted international competition. He
also discusses the use of the state intervening in the development of infrastructure and
investment through subsidization, making it clear that the laissez-faire imaginary of the industrial
revolution is primarily fictionalized. This critical take on the history of development is crucial to
explaining the success of East Asian late industrializers, and also explains why the neoliberal
prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF have not been particularly helpful to many developing
countries43. The purpose of Chang’s groundbreaking work is to demonstrate that the way that
development has been primarily undertaken is also what highly developed nations characterize
as “backwards” or “wrong”. Although this is a controversial claim, it sheds quite a bit of light on
why the rapid growth of the East Asian giants has been able to facilitate itself.
Going forward, it is imperative to understand that developmental state theorists have not
covered China in the same detail that they have covered Japan and South Korea. For Johnson,
this is because China is not plan rational, but rather plan ideological. However, this response
becomes more dubious over time given China’s economic success. It is true that the Chinese
state has strong ideological rigidity, but it has given itself a great deal more economic flexibility
than many contemporary scholars give it credit for. The crucial elements of a developmental
state are all present in China but have been disregarded due to its unorthodox political
development.

Chapter 3: The Use of Developmental State Programs in Facilitating China’s Growth
Since 1979
Both the theory of the developmental state and the core elements of China’s reform
have been established, and now it is necessary to consider the two in tandem in a way that has
not been considered before. Many well-respected theorists of the Chinese economy, such as
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Barry Naughton, point to China’s dynamic growth after reformation as an indication that
economic liberalism is the driving feature in China’s overall success. However, I would argue
that a better model to consider in terms of why China became so successful would be the
developmental state model discussed in the previous chapter. While it is convenient for
neoliberal economists to suggest that Chinese growth aligns well with their theoretical
groundwork, a closer analysis finds that the structure of the Chinese economy and its changes
throughout contemporary history are not indicative of a clear “win” for global capitalism. In
reality, there are many ways that the state has retained control over the direction of the
economy over time, despite being often overshadowed by the reforms focusing closely on
liberalizing the economy. The developmental state model explains Chinese growth in Reformist
China in six primary ways: the generation of Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) that
combined local government enterprise and competitive conditions; the state-directed investment
in historical capital development as crucial to modern industrial success; the “dual track system”
as a method of transitioning from full socialism to a mixed economy; the export-oriented
strategies that attract global markets to engage in investment in China and import from it; the
impact of central government planning to prop up certain industries with favorable industrial
policies; and the growth of total factor productivity through Chinese R+D and education
measures. These factors do not preclude China from becoming more liberal over time; clearly
the Reform period made sure of that. However, I argue that China’s success comes from the
fact that it has integrated the state into the market, not despite the presence of the state in
business activity.

Section 1: TVEs and the Chinese Experience of Early Mixed Enterprises
Chronologically, one of the starting points in the Chinese economy transforming from a
command economy to a developmental state was the formation of Township Village
Enterprises. Although TVEs have been described in Chapter 1 of this essay, an analytic look
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into the usefulness of TVEs in practice will elucidate how they are emblematic of the
developmental state model’s infant industry protection and state-controlled investment policies
and demonstrate that the TVEs have been crucial to China’s liftoff economically. To begin with,
TVEs were not “private” companies in practice. Although differentiated from state-owned
industries by the fact that they are owned by local governments, TVEs were still collectively
owned institutions commanded by the public sector. The formation of TVEs represented the
solidification of property rights and marketization, and generated movement away from a
centrally planned economy, but was also an exercise in corporate municipal governance. Local
governments jumped on the opportunity to create profit sharing initiatives, and contracted
managerial tasks to qualified, entrepreneurial individuals. These reforms are qualified as
“informal privatization”, where elements of the market are guided by the actions of public
officials and revenues generated are retained for local government spending44. These
cooperatives, when placed in a competitive setting, quickly outpaced the SOEs, given that
SOEs had little-to-no profit incentive and fewer opportunities for workers. While the success of
TVEs can be considered a move toward liberalization, they are also somewhat of a shock to the
conventional rhetoric of liberal economists in discussing property rights. Few would have
guessed that local cooperatives could function as efficiently as private firms in price formation
and wealth accumulation45. This management and operational style in which the cooperative
replaces the SOE is demonstrative of a clear government control of the economy mixed with the
necessary market qualities to make these apparatuses successful.
The mixed system of financing in China before the turn of the century had profound
impacts on the viability and spread of TVEs, as the state-directed nature of the financial
undertakings combined with market incentives for success made TVEs develop quickly while
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maintaining their profitability. In fact, China’s local governments took on considerable debt in the
80’s and 90’s while forming the TVEs, and in turn have been required to pay back that debt
through profit-driven business practices. The state guided the local development of initiatives
while also maintaining requisite competitive forces to incentivize productivity and profitability. In
practice, much of the debt that the township governments generated came from loans taken out
through the Central Finance Ministry, which provided the necessary investment capital for the
formation of individualized rural businesses. Informal rural credit cooperatives were also
sources of finance for the TVEs and played a role in the development of locales46. Chinese
firms’ early development was marked by the local government taking a key role in not only
managing the businesses, but also obtaining finance for these businesses and supporting the
formation of semi-private credit schemes that would transform into rural banks. Thus, by 2013,
fixed asset loans to TVEs exceeded 1.4 Trillion Yuan, demonstrating that directed financing has
been crucial to their unique success. It has also been empirically demonstrated that there is a
statistically significant positive regression between TVE productivity and financial support47. The
importance of these findings is not so much that they prove that financing has a positive effect
on businesses, but that TVEs have been so successful because they were able to channel
financing from the central government to the local township.
The dual track market system also encouraged the growth of TVEs, as it established
market price-setting while maintaining quotas that involved the state in the TVEs functioning.
Contrasting with the post-Soviet sphere’s rocky descent into market practices from a largely
commanded economy, the gradualism in which dual track reforms provided space for market
institutions allowed them to effectively take root in locales. By implementing decentralization as
a process of local public ownership, as well as creating the possibility for competitive economic
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transactions to occur by allowing market prices to form alongside the bureaucratic allocation of
goods, China was able to create successful businesses without fully privatizing the economy.
This “convergence theory” postulates that TVEs were successful because they gave Chinese
firms the opportunity to develop and take root in the commercial sector48, somewhat similarly to
the theory of Ha-Joon Chang that infant industry protection is necessary for a country to
modernize properly. Production since 1978 has, as a result, increased and diversified,
expanding into non-staple agricultural sectors given regional comparative advantages as well as
commercial industry. The development of households, villages, and primary producers within
this system, as well as the fact that these TVEs were often generating competitive pricing due to
the sheer volume of active TVEs, led to an increase in the productivity of these markets49. TVEs
benefitted from a dualist system in which pricing could be determined more freely than before,
and for this reason many TVEs would become successful private businesses and outshine the
state-owned sector.
Considering the role that local governments played in developing the early TVEs and
expanding their influence, a clear corollary between China’s development and other
developmental state growth emerges. Similarly, the way in which TVEs operated allowed them
to become local monopsonies rather than free labor markets, which embedded the
developmentalism into a local level more thoroughly than an unregulated labor market would.
Evaluating the change in labor productivity is perhaps most demonstrative of the effect that the
growth of TVEs had on rural China, which Lucy Zheng et al. demonstrate in their research.
Zheng and her fellow researchers use a traditional productivity modeling function (Y=f(K,L)*A
where A represents advancements in technology) to demonstrate that the change in labor
productivity was significant within the TVEs between 1980 and 2008. They suggest that the
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driving factors in causing this change were the greater development of human capital and real
wages, as well as the higher degree of investment in capital in areas with previously low capital
bases. In other words, she suggests that there was somewhat of a cyclical nature of growth the
TVEs, where greater investment in the community and the laborer led to higher labor
productivity and output, reinforcing these behaviors50. Private ownership since the 90’s has also
been suggested to have a positive effect on the TVE labor productivity, but the importance of
the era of public ownership was that it allowed human capital investment to become a priority for
rural areas. By managing the firm publicly and inviting outside managerial help in many
circumstances, local governments were also able to change the structure of the firm and share
specialized knowledge on proper management techniques. The hierarchical style of
management within the TVEs has generated favorable results as well, as it has generated a
functional degree of interrelatedness and trust within these firms51. The labor practices of the
TVE drastically improved the functionality of China’s economy by creating a system of
competitive local monopsonies rather than a single centralized price setter.
Although TVEs provided a much more stable approach to employment and management
of local firms, it is also necessary to demonstrate how this new system had a positive impact on
output and productivity. Beginning as early as 1978, one can see tremendous growth as a result
of TVE management styles in rural areas. In part, this growth can be explained by the
accessibility of financial support to individual TVEs, giving these institutions the possibility to
generate productive capital and organize functional manufacturing sectors at a local level
juxtaposed to the previous attempts to command the manufacturing sector at the state level52.
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Other scholars claim that the success of the TVEs is due to the fact that they had hard budget
constraints alongside considerable control by the local government, which forced them to be
competitive while also granting them a perspective that would be attuned to the best course of
action for a local business. Either way, TVEs formed the basis for Chinese consumer industry,
increasing their export output by over 70 billion dollars between 1988 and 199753. Similarly, the
productivity of these firms also began to outstrip the productivity of the state-owned enterprises
and established the TVE as the more profitable and sustainable economic practice. This is
particularly relevant in Jiangsu, where rural industrial output was once at the highest level in the
nation due to the success of their TVEs54. The TVE, compared to previously state-controlled
rural initiatives, combined the planning of local economies with the competitive efficiency of the
free market very well and allowed for previously underfunded communities to become much
wealthier. By structuring the firms in this way, the Chinese government was able to produce
considerably more output and consolidate their previous losses from state-owned rural
enterprises.
TVEs had such a strong impact because of their mixture of market fundamentals such
as competition and hard budget constraints alongside the leadership sourced from local
governments. The developmental state model highlighted in the previous chapter is clearly
applicable to the actions that the Chinese state took in intervening in the growth of local
enterprise, as access to funds and developmental models were applied to certain areas in order
to create successful, modernized firms. One could liken the rise of TVEs to the funding of infant
industries in the RoK and Japan, and the comparison would be appropriate. Both had state
funding available for investment in business infrastructure while maintaining a competitive
aspect in their production facilities. TVEs are the first of many idiosyncrasies within the Chinese
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system that lend themselves to the developmental state model, while also indicating the
success of such a model when applied.

Section 2: State-Directed Finance and Capital Development within China
TVEs have had an impressive impact on the growth of the Chinese economy during the
transition but were not the singular cause of development. Another feature of China’s
developmental state has been its state-led finance system, which has directed capital
investment and impacted the growth of endogenous Chinese firms. In fact, it would have been
nearly impossible for Chinese firms to form as well as they had if not for the intensive financial
undertakings of the banking sector, which accounted for 80 percent of financial assets within
China and loans accounting for 87 percent of non-financial sector funding as of 200655. Bank
loans have been primarily allocated by the People’s Bank of China, the state-owned bank that
dominates the national financial marketplace. The four largest banks in China have accounted
for 50 percent of national asset holdings well into the 2000’s56, demonstrating the power
intranational finance has on Chinese business. These banks have been historically stateowned, although are now also accountable to shareholders, and utilized their position as
nationalist investors to promote the growth of both the SOEs and eventually the TVEs as well57.
The growth that China experienced was partially based on a series of reforms in the 90’s that
liberalized the banking sector somewhat, allowing for the formation of semi-private and private
Chinese companies that could be propped up by state investment. By the late 90’s, government
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debt made up nearly 30 percent of funds annually created in the credit market, which
demonstrates the power of the Big Four Banks in transforming the economic landscape of
China58. Since 1994, Chinese state lending has included non-SOEs, granting more profitable
and productive commercial sectors resources to grow while maintaining state ownership of
infrastructural elements. China rapidly became an environment in which business could be
supported by the government, and within years multinational corporations indigenous to China
would dominate the business landscape both domestically and worldwide59. The banking sector
has played a major role in China’s miraculous growth and should not be neglected in their story.
The role of state-directed banking in the development of common infrastructure is
important to any developmental state model, and China is no exception. The financing of
specific state-owned enterprises that provide heavy industry, and the development of explicitly
public infrastructure such as road systems, indicate that China has been utilizing the Ministry of
Finance to accomplish crucial gains in areas that have net positive externalities for the
modernization of business and society. The energy production sector, which has remained
primarily state-owned, is a demonstration of the influence finance has on China’s developmental
trajectory. Although there is competition amongst differing energy groups within China, all are
subject to the oversight of the State Council, making them state-owned industries. Oil and
natural gas are subject to considerable review, while electricity is often less regulated. The
Chinese investment system’s role energy production makes the product entirely demand driven,
responding to the needs of the market rather than being focused on profiteering. In other words,
the purpose of the Chinese investment in state-owned energy production is based around the
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promotion of industry and development in the nation60. The implication here is that much of
Chinese financing of state-owned industries, even in the modern day, defies conventional
aspects of private rationality and is centered around market-building rather than marketsustaining. Rather than having private energy companies determine the level of production most
suitable for their own profit, Chinese finance invests in energy in order to support the
development of the economy as a whole and reveals the true purpose of state-owned industry
financing in the modern day. Similarly, public infrastructure and utilities development have been
a crucial aspect of state-oriented finance in China and have improved China’s total factor
productivity. Since 2004, infrastructure investment has dominated between 25 and 35 percent of
all fixed asset investment expenditures in China, showing the Chinese state’s focus on
modernity and positive peripheral development61. Much of this has been municipally
implemented and has raised the quality of life of the citizens of China, and although
convergence with the standards of living in developed countries has yet to occur, the clear focus
of the Chinese state on urbanization and infrastructure development emphasizes the state’s role
in providing basic adjustments to public safety and livelihood62. China’s state directed
investment in SOEs and public infrastructure demonstrate the core features of a developmental
state model, and has been important to the development of the economy as a whole as well.
China’s state banks have been successful in recent years partially because of their
hybrid structure, not conforming to traditional socialist or capitalist practices. While the PBC and
its subsidiaries are controlled by the Central Party, it also maintains public equity in order to
remain at least partially responsible to the public and the market. This makes it necessary for
there to be risk management, since the bank must perform well in order to attract equity holders,
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while also allowing for the maintenance of the Central Party’s prerogative. This creates a
system that encapsulates the best of both worlds, maintaining profitability while also enacting
the Central government’s economic policy. Since the structure of the banks has changed over
time, separating into four distinct entities during the Reform era, China’s banking sector has
been able to create specialized markets for capital that lend themselves to both the market and
the state. By dividing into the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the banking system
became more efficient in undertaking policy and coordinating economic activity, and the
formation of joint-stock and agricultural banks allowed local areas access to credit under the
supervision of the state. All four major banks, while controlled by the state, are subject to the
market through the international holdings of equity and the necessity to engage in competitive
international lending, which was a result of Zhu Rongyi’s reforms in 199263. City commercial
banks and rural credit cooperatives have been crucial to the localization of credit availability as
well. The way credit has been distributed to the public in China is a hybrid model of banking and
is fundamentally different from a liberal banking sector.
China’s state-directed banks have contributed the development of the private sector as
well. In fact, the growth rate of real GDP in China over the last 30 years has been consistently
symmetrical with the level of investment in the private sector, as well as the growth of credit
provided to private sector enterprises. It is thought that the direction of funds to the more
profitable non-state sector is partially what unlocked China’s potential for growth, as the
economy varies positively along the lines of this investment. The PBC also provided a
considerable amount of funding to private sector credit institutions in the 1980’s, making funds
available for entrepreneurship. While concerns about possible inflation curtailed bank lending in
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1989, the progress made beforehand led to considerable growth in the Chinese economy64.
Credit-led growth is a crucial contributor to China’s economic success, as it has provided
funding to untapped markets within the country. Chinese credit published was nearly 150% of
GDP in 2001, demonstrating the power of financial institutions in China’s continuing growth65.
Although cross-sectional studies have failed to disprove the possibility of reverse causality on
the question of the relationship between financial structures and GDP growth, investment in
non-state enterprises has been highly beneficial for the Chinese economy. In sum, there is
empirical evidence for the assertion that Chinese credit growth has led to expansion of the
Chinese economy66. State-directed finance has been kind to both the extensive public works
and the success of the private sector. The financial reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s promoted
a greater freedom of lending within the financial market, and yet still created an environment
much like Japan’s in which the state dictated the development of private sector enterprises.
State-directed finance has been addressed as a large part of the engine for Chinese
economic success, however it was only in conjunction with a greater deal of financial openness
that China was able to become so successful. In fact, the partial deregulation and
internationalization of Chinese finance has worked hand-in-hand with China’s big banks to
generate greater prosperity. It is widely agreed upon that China’s internationalization was what
led to the increase in salience of the credit market in the late 90’s, leading to a widespread
expansion of borrowing in the interest of emerging Chinese businesses. The publishing of credit
is proven to be largely based on the changes made in the 1990’s by Jordan Shan, who runs a
variance decomposition to find the effects of different factors on GDP growth and infers a causal
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relationship between credit published and GDP growth67. Introduction into the World Trade
Organization has been impactful, although it is limited to commercial dealings, in attracting
foreign capital to China. While many are critical of the role that state finance plays in China,
particularly since they remain relatively protectionist when it comes to finance, the introduction
to the WTO has helped the equity market continue to grow meteorically. Along the same lines,
foreign direct investment surged by nearly 50 billion dollars by 200268. There are noteworthy
elements of the opening up of China in its modern-day success, much of which is predicated
upon the interplay of both the state-directed banks and the foreign inflows of investment capital.
The use of financing directed by the state is perhaps the clearest parallel between the
Chinese developmental state and the developmental state theory. Giving favorable loans to
industrial businesses and transforming the landscape of public infrastructure within China
assisted in the generation of gains in the future, as it allowed for the internal economy to
become much more robust and provided large amounts of liquidity to firms that were starting up.
The direct control over the specific businesses and enterprises that would obtain funding gave
China the ability to be future oriented rather than hyper-focusing on profitable markets, and thus
contributed to their long-term growth in the same way that Japan and Korea’s financial
bureaucracies implemented measures to generate wealth by creating high-value firms and
technologies. Ultimately, the use of state-directed finance helped China grow into the
competitive international economy it now is.

Section 3: SOEs and Their Role in Shaping the Chinese Economy Over Time
It is important to note that, while the changing of the financial structure and the success
of the TVEs contributed to China’s economic development from the 1980’s onward, state-owned
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enterprises have played a consistent role in China’s success as well. SOEs have impacted the
layout of capital goods prior to the reform period, as well as in the post-reform period continuing
to supply necessary infrastructure for basic business transactions. They have contributed a
great deal to research, development, and innovation within China. Proving the last of these
claims will be a good place to start, as the historical development of the SOE should be
considered more later. Although most scholars agree that there has been considerable TFP
growth in non-state productive facilities, they often neglect to mention the role research and
development by the SOEs has had toward contributing to economic growth. Much of the
innovation in machinery, chemical-based, and pharmaceutical-based firms comes from R+D in
large-scale SOEs, and an empirical examination of LSSOEs in Beijing has demonstrated that
there is a statistically significant impact that SOE R+D has on the overarching economy69. What
this demonstrates is that privatization alone is not responsible for China’s rise in productivity,
and we should not be fooled into thinking it is. Rather, SOEs have generated innovation within
China quite considerably, despite the continuing perception that they are nothing more than a
drain on the economy.
Although this essay focuses on the Reform period, it is also necessary to observe the
way that SOEs in the Maoist period may have played a role in the development of China’s
economy going forward. This is not to suggest that the Maoist period was idyllic in any sense,
but to explore the full legacy of SOEs it is necessary to dip into the murky waters of the 50’s,
60’s, and 70’s before addressing contemporary SOEs. Despite the deserved horror and
reverence towards the millions of lives taken during the Great Leap Forward, Maoist China set
up many of the necessary structures for longer term success in the global competitive economy.
One such example is the system of irrigation and the organization of the larger agricultural
economy. Although famine is remembered as the hallmark of the Maoist agricultural
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cooperatives, infrastructure and capital was invested heavily in order to (try and) achieve the
over-inflated goals of growth that Mao demanded. Over the span of Mao’s life, irrigation and
fertilization became much more common throughout the major agricultural areas of China.
Similarly, the growth of industrial capital within China became pronounced between the 50’s and
80’s, despite growing at ever faster rates after Mao’s death. In fact, the production of new
machinery made up 24% of the share of net industrial output by 1978, considerably raised from
the 5% preceding the shift toward communist governance70. It is important to be critical of this
period for the flagrant human rights abuses that took place during it, however early capital
building in China was largely a result of the SOEs in the Maoist period, and this history is
necessary in considering the industrialization of China as a whole.
The history of SOEs has significantly shaped their importance in Chinese society,
however their importance is no less palpable now than it ever was. While they may be fading to
the background, accounting for less and less of the production process as time goes on, there is
something to be said about the way SOEs operate in the post-reform period that demonstrates
the value of learning from impractical practices. In fact, the profits of Chinese SOEs since 2005
have nearly doubled due to the importance of the reform period in maintaining general stability.
SOEs still play a considerable role in the economy, accounting for an estimated 23% of
business income within the country in 201771. The importance of the state sector in the
contemporary period is often explained by the reforms in the 1990’s, in which the Party decided
to focus only on large-scale industries and abandon small, consumer enterprises that were
being beaten out by private companies and TVEs. The restructuring of these enterprises has
been crucial to their current relative efficiency, and by 2016 it appeared that SOEs were actually
becoming favorable once more in China due to the profits they enjoyed in the 2010’s. Although
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the operational efficiency between state-owned and private enterprises has continued to widen,
the reform period marked the beginning of a brighter future for Chinese SOEs72. Despite this
micro-level inefficiency, SOEs have also been crucial in maintaining and promoting economic
stability and technical progress. From a Keynesian perspective, these SOEs have retained a
necessary level of control over the economy for the continuation of employment and investment
during economic fluctuations. Although it may be enticing to call for the privatization of SOEs
due to their generally poor comparative performance, they have contributed significantly to the
stability of the economy in the contemporary period and have been improving as they become
more competitive. SOEs are a major asset to China and will continue in aiding the national
economy as time goes on despite the common critique of their inefficiency.
In the contemporary period, SOEs have also played a considerable role in job creation
and stability. As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Keynesian view of economic
stability puts an emphasis on the government maintaining employment to prevent economic
crisis. Between 1979 and 1996, there is a clear emphasis within the Chinese economy on state
sector employment, where SOE job creation, where state employment grew by around 10
million people and wage rates more than doubled73. Although critiques of the widespread
welfare provided by the Chinese government colloquially known as the “Iron Rice Bowl” are
common, the employment in the state sector provided living quarters and necessities to workers
and maintained steady economic growth. These policies affected the countryside as well, as
state produce quotas persisted into the reform era despite the diversification of produce on the
market, allowing for both urban and rural dwellers to have some form of government
employment. Ultimately, because they were faced with few competitive pressures, the SOE
employees were guaranteed a level of comfort during the reform period that promoted stable
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urban living standards. This not only allowed for the employment levels of China to remain
somewhat stable during a tumultuous period of reform, but also allowed the emerging private
sector to have a relatively soft impact on social conditions and living standards. While it is
arguable that this feature retarded the growth of China’s market, it is also clear that the Chinese
working class was already perturbed by the transition away from welfare-state measures,
leading to mass protests and rebellions. Instead, SOEs quietly became more capital intensive
while still absorbing a great deal of urban unemployment74. It may have been a ‘necessary evil’
for China to retain such a great deal of state employment in a rapidly privatizing economy, as
doing so minimized possible civilian unrest and maintained economic stability.
While often overlooked due to their inefficiencies, SOEs have helped China’s growth
substantially through the historical development of industrial capital and organization. Despite
being looked down upon, these enterprises have demonstrated that long-run capital
accumulation through state investment can successfully elevate the overall wellbeing of the
nation. SOEs provide a unique shift on the traditional developmental state model by factoring in
the ability of states to intervene in the economy directly. While developmental states in other
cases have mainly used industrial policy guiding their institutions, China utilized outright state
ownership of enterprises to enhance the technologies and working conditions of the nation.
Nowadays, SOEs play a less direct role, but they have been empowering China for decades
through their mass employment and infrastructure projects.

Section 4: Export-Import Ratios, FDI, and Joint Ventures in Generating an Internationally
Competitive Economy
Another crucial feature of the developmental state model’s application in China is the
use of foreign trade in a way that advances the interests of the home country. In China, this
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breaks down into three primary subfactors: export-led growth, joint economic ventures, and
foreign direct investment. The export-led growth hypothesis has been prominent in scholarship
about China’s rapid rise in economic standing, explaining that China’s recent economic
openness has resulted in huge gains for the country evidenced by the fact that between 1989
and 1994 the value of China’s foreign trade rose from under 40 billion US dollars to 236 billion75.
By loosening control over exports and tariffs, alongside liberalizing the foreign exchange rate,
China was able to expand outwards very quickly. China was able to transform their share of
exports globally from .9% to 2.6% between 1980 and 1994, demonstrating the clear shift in
prominence of exports to the Chinese economy during this time76. Similarly, a regression of
export growth on investment-output ratio and labor force growth are both positive and
statistically significant according to a study undertaken by Andy Kwan and Benjamin Kwok77.
What this evidence shows is that export growth has been accompanied by positive shifts in the
value of investment and labor in China and has positively contributed to the overall growth of the
nation. As time goes on, China proves to be growing significantly as a result of their foreign
trade balances.
Building on connections made by opening, China began creating joint ventures with
other countries and companies, muddling the lines between public and private enterprise while
maintaining a competitive environment. In the first 10 years of the reform alone over 12,000 joint
ventures were formed through multinational agreement, outnumbering other kinds of foreign
firms in China considerably78. Thus, the joint venture is a kind of gateway into China for many
other countries, allowing China to gain inflows of foreign investment in projects that it can
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oversee and control. The characteristics of Chinese joint ventures tended to promote a high
level of government involvement and oversight, usually formed with neighboring countries such
as Japan, South Korea, as well as zones such as Hong Kong (which had not formally become a
part of China again until 1997). Joint ventures are often used as tools for less developed
economies to gain skills and technologies by working in association with other nations, and in
China joint ventures were often much more successful and prominent than multinational private
enterprises. China’s support for joint ventures is also much higher because of the inclusion of
clauses that cede control of the firms to Chinese managers after a variable period79. It has also
been found that Chinese joint ventures have had a positive empirical effect on both industry
performance as well as international cooperation over time, indicating that they have been
positive for both the interactions between China and other countries as well as useful in creating
a dynamic for a previously insular China in the world economy80. It is important that joint
ventures are recognized for their success in bringing up the standard of China’s economy while
maintaining a degree of governmental control over the processes of a newly emerging global
market.
The final feature of China’s turn towards the global market is inward and outward foreign
direct investment. China’s FDI inflows were second only to the United States in the late 1990’s,
but it was necessary to engage in some level of policy control as well. In 1978, the famously
cited “Open Door Policy” began to promote foreign investment in Chinese firms, opening
internal markets to international buyers. While a system of equity-based investment had yet to
be hammered out, this early change extended the invitation of foreign firms to the Chinese
market. The major forms of FDI that have developed have been joint ventures and wholly
owned subsidiaries, in which foreign firms are partially (if not wholly) in control of the equity of in
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exchange for Chinese labor and resources. The high levels of technological and skill
transference present in the FDI elevated both China and their trading partners, resulting in
profitable results for both parties. The National People’s Congress determines the approval of
different ventures and oversees their implementation, creating a market with the necessary
bureaucracy to enforce the contractual elements of the foreign enterprises. Alongside the NPC
exist many standards and practices agencies, such as the Ministries of Labor and Personnel,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the State Development Planning
Commission, which make sure that foreign firms are able to operate within code. From an
institutionalist perspective, these organizations promote fair trade between nations and create a
proper, trustworthy environment to do business within81. The marked boom in FDI in the 90’s
was redoubled after WTO membership, aside from the financial crisis of the late 2000’s. There
was also a noticeable increase in countries all around the globe investing in China, where
before WTO membership Chinese FDI was dominated by Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the United
States. Between 2001 and 2006 FDI inflows doubled, demonstrating that Chinese attempts to
incentivize foreign investment had been quite successful, though most of the FDI has been
centered around eastern China while much of the rest is left with very little82. Still, China has
been particularly skilled at attracting foreign business to the nation, most likely due to the ease
of business that the strong bureaucratic atmosphere has facilitated as well as the considerable
tax breaks for foreign firms and ventures.
While attracting heavy flows of FDI into the country, China has been able to leverage
their own investment in developing countries to further economic growth as well. By 1996, this
trend became extremely clear, as China had begun to allocate around 18 billion dollars to
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foreign direct investment of their own. This trend began in the early 1990’s, where China
doubled its yearly FDI output as a percentage of GDP annually83. This is a grand departure from
the half a million dollars of FDI that China engaged in the pre-reform period. Early FDI
measures were undertaken by sub-sections of SOEs, known as foreign trade organizations
(FTOs) and foreign business-oriented corporations (FBOCs) and were rapidly on the rise
between 1980 and 1990. This period was when FDI out of the country began to really take off,
and in the 90’s it became an even more prevalent feature of the economy. Much of this effort
was focused on Latin America, the Caribbean, and surrounding developmental states such as
Taiwan, the RoK, and Japan. The purpose of this outward investment is to expand the scale of
Chinese industries, furthering China’s growth84. By 2010, the outward FDI that China has
provided has risen to 68.8 billion dollars total85, which helps maintain the stability of their upward
trajectory by reaffirming available resources for production and acquiring strategic assets. This
allows China to further its technological capabilities. It indicates that the domestic industries of
China are expanding and looking to obtain cheap labor and natural resources while advancing
their technological capital. These knowledge spillovers are a net positive for both countries
involved, since the country receiving the investment is also gaining access to advanced
technologies that they originally did not have86. Overall, one can tell that outward FDI has been
a source of increasing Chinese advancement.
Foreign direct investment has been crucial to economic development in a globalizing
world system, and China has benefited considerably from the international market growth that
has transpired. The use of joint ventures plays into China’s interests considerably by providing a
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service to foreign investors that becomes Chinese property in the long term and creates a
business environment conducive to Chinese interests. Similarly, outward expansion into
neighboring countries has developed the scale of Chinese firms, giving them access to
international resources and furthering the industrial capacities of businesses. As a result, China
has become an international leader when it comes to the operation of the global economy and
has demonstrated that the interests of business and the state can coincide when properly
aligned.

Part 5: Chinese State Investment in Labor and Capital Productivity
China has properly invested in indigenous factor productivity growth, which has led to its
success in development and allowed it to be competitive on a global scale. One of the core
resources that China has tapped into is the education system, which has been historically much
more robust during the Maoist and Post-Mao eras than it ever had been before. Since the
formation of the PRC, literacy and basic education swiftly became a pressing interest of the
party establishment. Although media and information are well regulated by the CCP, leading
one to question the validity of the Chinese education system in terms of biases, the basic
foundations of education spread rapidly since the PRC came into prominence. Because the
ideology of the CCP focuses on the advancement of the proletariat from peasantry to skilled
labor, widespread available education was an early goal of the PRC. Although the intellectual
culture within China during the Maoist period was relatively myopic, demonstrated by the harsh
crackdown on the resulting dissent of the scholars during the Hundred Flowers movement, the
promotion of ideology often required literacy and knowledge, and thus the Maoist period was
also marked by a genuine scholarly boom during the Cultural Revolution. 1965 was the year
when education began to become much more accessible due to the reforms of Liu Shaoqi,
forming a greater mass of new intellectual and work-study schools meant for national
advancement. By 1978, this desire for greater productivity and skill-building was further
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magnified by Deng Xiaoping, aided by new laws in 1993 and 1999 that increased investment in
research-oriented education87. Nowadays, China is advanced in its education system according
to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, as nearly the entire country
has access to universal primary and secondary education, and Chinese students in urban hubs
outperform other students in high-performing countries in mathematics, reading skill, and
science88. China has advanced considerably since 1949 from the hectic, poor education system
of the Kuomintang and has become very impressive in terms of global education performance.
Education has been a crucial part in the development of human capital, which has been
one of China’s main improvements during the Reform period. The purpose of human capital
advancement is to improve the skills of the working population of a country and allow them to
engage in more productive labor. Excluding human capital investment and simply focusing on
technological capital is an unproductive approach for a nation to take, since human capital
improvement is necessary as a precursor to technological capital advancement. Although
national investment in human capital is much lower than the investment in physical capital, this
is largely because funding for education is often enacted on a local level. This creates much
more palatable options for personal advancement within urban, wealthy areas than poorer, rural
areas. Contemporary econometric studies have also highlighted the use of incentivization
structures arising in the 80’s and 90’s to promote human capital advancement as a result of
returns to education, and some estimate that it is higher than the rate of return in the United
States and Western Europe in the contemporary period89. The division between the rural and
the urban sectors, emblematized by the hukou system of labor migration prevention,
demonstrates that there are further improvements China could make in terms of allowing
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greater human capital development in the modern era. That said, the turn of the workforce from
being 71% to 30% agricultural during the Reform era is demonstrative of the rapid progress
towards urbanization that has been transpiring as we speak90. One of the primary motivating
factors in developing human capital has been the turn to the private sector within the country, as
many of these companies are better equipped to train new workers and compensate welleducated workers better. The incredible rise in college admissions within China has also
demonstrated the rapid advancement of human capital and personnel skill91. To continue its
upward trajectory, China must reconcile some of the issues it has with human capital
development while maintaining the favorable elements that have facilitated its rapid growth.
Human capital alone has risen significantly in China, but China has engaged in
extremely intensive technological growth as well. Although how much technological innovation
alone has factored into productivity growth is fiercely contested, it is overall accepted that it has
been a driving force in the TFP growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors alike. In fact,
more recent studies have found that between 1990 and 2009, the ratio of TFP to economy-wide
output fluctuated between 69% and 81%92. One of the main players in the extension of
technology has been increased research and development due to the rapid increase in China’s
educated classes, as well as the private firms that employ them. In other words, the expansion
of knowledge within the country has led to the betterment of the facilities of firms across China,
including so-called invisible capital goods such as those based in programing. Yanrui Wu’s
“Productivity, Innovation and China’s Economic Growth” demonstrates this growth in all sectors,
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where technology growth dominates efficiency growth in terms of TFP growth over the years93.
Much of this is true of the agricultural sector, which has been demonstrated by Songqin Jin
between the years 1990 and 2004. This is of interest because, unlike changes in the industrial
sector, the agricultural sector’s research and development is largely organized by the state,
creating more productive strains and seeds for staple crops and engineering hybrid grains for
Chinese consumption. In more recent years China’s agricultural system has benefited from
importing horticultural technology as well as cooperative research efforts and grants94. Overall,
the growth of the technological base of China has been one of the most beneficial elements in
its contemporary TFP growth, which will be analyzed below.
Altogether, these factors have allowed China to experience an impressive increase in
their total factor productivity (TFP). TFP has been growing explosively within China due to the
heavy investment in productivity advancement. By focusing on the relative return to wages and
capital over time, we can estimate the changes in TFP within China since the reform period. The
urban wage growth rate is particularly striking, as it evidences that urban wages have been
consistently improving since the reform period between 2.36% at the lowest and 14.76% at the
highest since 197895. Annual wage changes within the country have also been consistently
positive. The value of China’s capital stock has been a striking change over the last 40 years,
growing from around 1,200 million yuan to 9,500 million yuan between 1978 and 2002. All the
while, China has retained a rate of return to capital that hovers around 11%, demonstrating that
a massive expansion of capital does not necessarily equal immense downturn of the rate of
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return96. These figures tell a story of massive success in generating highly productive capital
while also engaging in deepening. It is striking how these positive indicators of TFP have
improved the economy of China substantially between 1978 and 2002 and are demonstrative of
how an economic superpower can come about if the country focuses on TFP growth.
Expansive growth is important, but innovation within a developing economy is crucial to
success as well. China’s government has historically allocated quite a bit of spending to
improving their education services, advancing the labor market, and producing new
technologies. This has resulted in a massive growth in the total factor productivity of the country
and has contributed to their meteoric rise in influence and power. Rather than depending on
foreign firms and FDI exclusively in their development of the economy, China invested in
indigenous technological and human capital growth along the same lines as Japan and Korea.
By creating internationally competitive productive facilities, China has been able to catch up to
other developed countries in terms of economic performance in a relatively short period of time
and has mimicked the experiences of the other developmental states in this way.

Part 6: The Formation, Planning, and Enactment of China’s Industrial Policy
Even before the reform period, The Chinese Communist Party has utilized ‘Industrial
Policy’ to attain economic goals. Industrial policy is often confused with any economic policy.
However, industrial policy is much more specific, defined by state intervention in a specific
market or sector to encourage its growth. Industrial policy goals have been historically outlined
in five-year plans, beginning with the famed First Five Year Plan in 1953. The purpose of Maoist
industrial policy was direct and simple; generate extensive growth of industrial plants through
Stakhanovite influencing of peoples. In the contemporary era, direct construction goals have
been replaced by more abstract principles and economic ideations within the five-year plans.
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Because this essay is based around the developmental state model, the most important FYPs
to our research are the contemporary ones, which create developmental goals and institute
them through influence on business rather than direct control of construction. By focusing on the
9th through 12th FYPs, it becomes clear which industrial policies have been utilized by the state
to nudge businesses in certain ways. By providing favorable construction conditions, tax
exemptions, fiscal injections, and expedited materials and exports, industries favored by the
modern FYPs are set up for greater success than other industries. The development of China’s
pharmaceutical, chemical, mineral, and food processing industries have all benefited a great
deal from targeted FYP intervention. Industries preferred by Central Planners have a gateway to
success that other firms do not, and this allows China to make decisions in a way that is
conscious of the development of the economy as a whole97. Five Year Plans have been the
Chinese government’s means of directing Industrial Policy throughout the last 80 years, and in
recent years the industrial policy has been more in line with the type of policy practiced in other
East Asian states.
Many of China’s ventures into Industrial Policy (IP) have garnered it attention from
outside forces in the modern era, particularly foreign firms that decry discriminatory policies that
favor Chinese business. However, IP has been present throughout the current millennium as
one of China’s primary tools for market growth. In fact, use of IP was severely limited until the
reform period and has only been rising in prominence in the contemporary era. One of the main
triggers for the IP use was the severe worldwide economic recession of 2008-2009, which
prompted a more Keynesian approach to countercyclical fiscal injections to the economy. That
said, China took direct advice and institutions from Japan when deciding to engage in their own
IP expansion in the 80’s, so Industrial Policy is not a strictly new tool in China’s toolbelt. By
establishing planning and economic bureaucracies that followed a more Japanese approach
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than the historical Maoist planning style, China sought to support specific industries that would
be crucial to the functioning of the economy as well as industries that would promote the
economy’s international competitiveness, somewhat akin to the support of keiretsus in Japan.
Two major players in the transformation of Chinese business guidance were the State Structural
Reform Commission and the State Economic Commission, both of which organized and
administrated large-scale business groups in the hopes of guiding the economy. To outsiders, it
seemed as though China was liberalizing, but in reality it was shifting from a regime of direct
control to one of indirect guidance. As a result, sectoral and cross-sectoral commissions
became commonplace in fueling the growth of key industries in the 2000’s, leading to the
advancement of the automotive, IT, and machinery production industries98. In particular, the
subsidization of firms engaging in novel technological innovation were given stimulus and
oversight. China has been proactive in modernizing its approach to business, but has still
maintained a degree of control over the economy by engaging in Industrial Policy.
The use of Industrial Policy in China has been discussed, but how effective has it been
in promoting growth? By analyzing the National Bureau of Economic Research data of the
growth of the shipbuilding industry, one of China’s main IP targets in the early 2000’s, it
becomes clearer that IP has played a role in the success of targeted industries. By 2009, China
had become the largest shipbuilding country in terms of tons, and new shipyards were
flourishing across the Chinese coast. China’s direct intervention in this market seems to have
led to its explosive growth, as the introduction of shipbuilding subsidies seems to coincide with
the rise of new entrants into shipbuilding and capital expenditures associated with the industry.
The assumption that NBER makes in their case study is that the introduction of IP in this sector
increased the productive returns to investment and entry into shipbuilding, which thus led to a
major flow of new indigenous business into the sector. While shipyard costs remained relatively
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static, the supply of shipbuilders increased dramatically to meet the international market
demand. Because shipbuilding is a capital-intensive industry, it experiences intense economies
of scale that furthers the increased output of subsidization by lowering the marginal costs
associated with production when the firms increase in scope. This is important because it
explains why IP is so successful with large scale emerging industries, as the subsidized capital
can go a long way in reducing the marginal costs of the individual firms. Thus, between 2006
and 2013 China’s market share in shipbuilding increased by 40%99. Entry was doubled while
exit was significantly depressed, and ship-related prices decreased considerably worldwide100.
In this instance, China’s industrial policy allowed it to corner the market for shipbuilding and
even beat out its competitors in South Korea and Japan, and this would not have been possible
without the government subsidization of the industry.
The final element in this puzzle, the prominence of Industrial Policy in contemporary
China, is directly associated with the Developmental State theory of growth in countries like
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. In fact, it is one of the most mentioned elements of the
Developmental State by the theorists covered in Chapter 2. China adopting this model and
utilizing it to achieve its own growth is crucial to identifying it as a Developmental State as well.
In fact, the use of Industrial Policy is perhaps one of the clearest signifiers of China’s status
among the East Asian Developmental States, though China became involved in IP by
liberalizing rather than bureaucratizing further. China’s status as a Developmental State should
be clear at this point, as all the elements of its reforms involve a strategic mixture of state
intervention and competitive markets on a global scale.

Concluding Thoughts:
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The approach that this paper has taken is based on acknowledging China’s history since
1979, addressing the fundamental theory of the developmental state, and providing a holistic
understanding of China’s growth that explains it through the lens of the developmental state
without discounting Chinese idiosyncrasies. This has required a thorough examination of
multiple facets of the Chinese economy. The six features listed in the final chapter are by no
means exhaustive but represent the most relevant aspects of Chinese developmentalism. By
highlighting the relevant practices that demonstrate China is a developmental state, many
economic historians may argue with the points left unsaid; after all, the dynamics of the labor,
capital, and product markets have all significantly liberalized, and yet there is little recognition of
this factor in Chinese growth in Chapter 3. To clarify, the purpose of Chapter 3 is not to simply
highlight all the features of the Chinese economy that have promoted its growth, but to analyze
the specific growth factors that could be interpreted as fitting into the developmental state
model. The purpose of this essay not to alienate the free market, but to understand how it can
interact with the state in what Chalmers Johnson would call a ‘plan rational’ economy. China is
traditionally left out of the developmental state theory of growth because of its prior era of
socialism, and this is a mistake. It is more sensible to expand the theory of the developmental
state to include China, and to allow China’s growth experience to inform the theory of the
developmental state in turn.
This paper expands the very concept of the developmental state by highlighting China’s
interventionist role in the economy and comparing it to the other examples of developmental
states. What ultimately makes China unique is that it took a different route to becoming a
developmental state than other countries. While Japan evolved during its Meiji period and
beyond to accommodate a centralized bureaucracy from the former scattered feudal daimyos of
the Tokugawa period, China expressed a different trajectory, and this is most likely why analysts
are so apt to describe China as a success story for liberalism. Rather than engaging in statebuilding to reach the developmental state model, China engaged in a form of marketization from
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a completely state directed economy. Thus, theorists are quick to argue that China’s success is
primarily a result of the market institutions that had arisen within the country, giving no real
thought to the reformation of the role of the state in the economy. In this paper, however, it has
been highlighted that China has not grown so quickly because it is a free market country, as it is
in many ways still controlled by bureaucrats and legislators. There is an element of nuance
missing from academics who describe China as state capitalist, labelling China as authoritarian
socially but liberal economically. China’s growth is attributable to its more interventionist
elements combined with the transformation of the market system to include private and semiprivate elements. The essence of the argument I have presented is a rejection of neoliberal
economic theories, presented by scholars such as Deepak Lal, in favor of a Keynesian,
developmental state-oriented approach to viewing possible economic growth in countries. China
is idiosyncratic in the way that it has been able to mobilize resources towards the furthering of
their economy but their method does not need to be exclusive to them.
For quite some time, liberal theories of development have dominated the international
lending scheme. Organizations such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization advise
their members to consciously engage in market-based economics within their countries,
believing that this is the best way to attract foreign capital and encourage innovation within the
country. China’s experience with development counters the narrative of these institutions,
demonstrating that it may be more optimal in the long run to utilize strong state bureaucracies
and guide the economy toward greater success. After all, there is no reason why other countries
would be unable to adopt township-village enterprises, large-scale investment projects in
infrastructure and TFP growth, or utilize industrial policy in order to provide benefits for the
expansion of crucial sectors. Rather than rely on institutions that have been failing developing
countries, it makes more sense for countries to adopt a more Chinese approach to
development, mixing market fundamentals and state guidance. Even smaller steps, such as
creating state enterprises to perform basic infrastructural construction, would improve the

64
productivity of the developing world if China’s experience is any indication. By analysing China’s
growth over time, it becomes clear that economic planning has more value than neoclassicals
let on. Hopefully, developing countries across the globe can learn from China’s experience and
advocate for a more systemic approach to economic development than allowing markets to
grow through simple deregulation.
Using China as a model may not be the solution to the issues developing countries have
had in sustaining growth, but it at least deserves recognition in challenging the conventional
prescriptions for economic progress. It is not an overstatement to say that there is a message
that many are missing from China’s growth; yes, liberalism has its place, but in concert with
state direction it is possible for a country to become a world leader and rival to the United States
in less than 40 years. Of course, China has had situational arrangements that may not
necessarily precipitate themselves in other countries, such as a 40-year history of socialism
preceding 1979 that set the stage for capital building and strong bureaucracy in the
contemporary era. However, it is worth noting that China’s approach to developmentalism has
brought about extraordinary change within the country and has given rise to a new form of the
developmental state. Hopefully, through China’s more recent expansion outwards with the Belt
and Road Initiative, other countries will be able to adopt Chinese economic practices and
succeed as a result.
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